Foreign Factors in Israel's War on Gaza: Analysis by Al-Jazeera

 

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Theories abound about what regional actors can do, but there may be a more accurate way to look at their concerns.

Israel continued its ground offensive inside the Gaza Strip on Sunday, in what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the "second phase."

Semantics aside, the three-day stretch is a not-so-big-and-fast move, a step up from two quick in-and-out nighttime incursions. But not an all-out attack.

Soldiers call it spy-in-force. In preparation for offensive action, small units attack to probe their enemy's positions, strength, tactics, and operational readiness. Initial battle plans are then adapted using the knowledge gained.

Nevertheless, Israel's ground advance appears timid: it is low and slow, with great emphasis from ministers and generals.

Some pundits may see this as a sign that the Israeli military does not have sufficient weapons reserves. But it cannot, as it continues to bombard Gaza with constant aerial bombardment and long-range shelling that has not stopped for more than three weeks now, causing massive indiscriminate casualties.

Hamas casualties are not known, but it is likely that hundreds of Palestinians have died in Gaza for each Hamas fighter.

Israel's slow progress may be deliberate, to allow for diplomacy, secret negotiations and secret deals. Its neighbors Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria do not want the conflict to escalate and are taking care not to escalate it in any way. Qatar is leading diplomatic efforts to secure the release of prisoners held by Hamas and avoid further escalation.

How Turkey and Iran are seen?

The position of Turkey and Iran, two major regional powers with strong armies, is particularly strange.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan slammed Israel as an usurper in his address to a large rally in support of Palestine on Saturday, a day before the 100th anniversary of the Turkish Republic.

Turkey's criticism of Israel is almost certain to remain political, but Iran's position is more complex, and what it might do remains a mystery.

Iran is an open enemy of Israel. It established, trained, organized, armed and continued to support a series of sub-state armed groups in the region. The largest and best known of these is Lebanon-based Hezbollah, but Iran also has a presence through proxies in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, lands where bloody conflicts have been or are being fought.

The big question is, will Iran - directly - join the war on Gaza?

The analysis suggests that Tehran would lose more than gain by engaging in a major war. There are only two ways Iran can take the fight to Israel: ground and ballistic.

Overland, it would have to pass through Iraq and Syria. Both are Iranian allies, but neither would allow the use of its territory, even if the move were militarily plausible. The US, which still maintains a security presence and interests in Iraq, will be less pleased. 

The government in Damascus, which controls the areas through which Iran must pass, knows that even a temporary Iranian military presence could easily fuel the Syrian conflict.

Such an adventurous march across the deserts is not militarily feasible - it would mean crossing 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) from Iran to Israel, under skies in which the US and its allies Undoubtedly air supremacy.

Iran's other option could be to launch its powerful long-range ballistic missiles against Israel, whose Iron Dome already struggles to match the crude but deadly missiles of Hamas.

But Tehran's generals have been trying for decades to predict the likely response to its use of missiles — and, apparently, they concluded that most would be unfavorable to Iran.

If any of Tehran's decision makers thought their missiles could somehow overwhelm their adversaries' defenses, they were brutally brought to reality on October 19, when a US Navy ship stationed in the Red Sea The destroyer intercepted and shot down four cruise missiles. Iran-backed Houthi fighters from Yemen against Israel. 

USS Carney also shot down 14 drones. It is not known whether the Houthis decided to confront Israel independently, or whether Tehran had a say in it, but the end of these missiles was a message for both.

The US Navy has demonstrated 100 percent success against missiles en route. In Israel, the Iron Dome is believed to permanently stop more than 90 percent of incoming projectiles. Faced with this, it would make military sense for Iran to pursue a missile war.

So how will things progress? 

As difficult and dangerous as it is to make such a bold claim, I think the United States has reason to believe that non state actors will be involved in the Gaza conflict. Unless there is a major increase in force or a move to completely expel Palestinians from the Strip.

The current, geographically limited "war" should not thus turn into a wider regional conflict, a message that will be made clear to all countries through diplomatic channels and mediators who have contacts with both sides. 

US President Joe Biden has reiterated US support for Israel, but has also made several statements calling for de-escalation of tensions and the release of hostages to be given a chance. But if there are conversations, won't at least some of the participants try to carry them forward?

The real reason for the unprecedented deployment of U.S. forces in the region - one aircraft carrier battle group in the Mediterranean and another in the Gulf - is to bolster reconnaissance, surveillance and electronic intelligence assets, as well as a small ground force. 

Discourage any foolish actions by rogue generals or non-state armed groups like Hezbollah.

To give the plan a chance, every avenue should be explored to defuse the conflict - including asking US ally Israel to slow down enough to save face locally, but However, allow time for negotiations that could secure the release of some or all of the hostages.

Whatever the numbers and timeline involved, it would be an encouraging step.

(Courtesy: Al-Jazeera)

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