Countering Chinese Expansion in the South China Sea (SCS): Issues of US lead Collective Action

Image Credit: Google

Adil Javed

China has been extending its sphere of influence in the territorial waters of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, using various measures such as its coast guard, armed fishing fleet, militias, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy.

China has also constructed artificial islands and deployed military assets in the disputed region, posing a challenge to the US and its allies.

The article discusses the collective action problem that hinders the United States and its allies from effectively countering China's expansion in the South China Sea (SCS).

The Collective Action Problem:

The collective action problem arises from several factors.

a. United States’ approach of Freedom of Navigtaion Operations:

The US grand strategy and its theater strategy in the Indo-Pacific prevent it from adopting a more assertive approach that could effectively deter China's advances.

The US has primarily relied on freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), overflight operations, and security assistance and cooperation, which have proven insufficient to halt China's expansion.

Image Credit: Google

b. Weakness of involved South East Asian States:

The four Southeast Asian states (Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia) are too weak and divided to effectively collaborate in countering China's increasing influence.

• While Vietnam has a strong military, but its proximity and trade ties with China limit its actions.

• Malaysia has sought cooperation with the US and Vietnam but remains hesitant to expand its military partnership.

• The Philippines, although a US ally, has the weakest military among the four countries and has faced setbacks in the Spratly Islands.

• Indonesia, despite its military strength, is nonaligned and limited in security cooperation activities with the United States.

The lack of stronger national leadership, capabilities, and commitment from both the Southeast Asian countries and the US exacerbates the collective action problem.

Developing countries find it challenging to acquire and maintain expensive weapons systems necessary for deterring aggression.

c. Constitutional and Politico-Economic Constraints of Japan and Australia:

Constitutional and politico-economic constraints in Japan and Australia prevent them from taking more assertive actions.

Even if the US were to lead in countering China, it would be difficult for the Southeast Asian states, Japan, and Australia to follow suit.

d. The Leverage of China:

China has advantages in proximity, infrastructure development, and lending in Southeast Asia.

However, it also highlights that China's heavy-handed approach has alienated several countries.

Despite the remaining US advantages in soft power, foreign direct investment, naval power, and alliances, Southeast Asian countries must hedge their relations between the US and China, making collective action in the SCS more challenging.

The article here, points out that China's expansion is less difficult to achieve than a successful attack on Taiwan.

The Southeast Asian countries' defensive capabilities are more effective in protecting their land masses than blocking China's expansion in the SCS.

Furthermore, other potential partners like Japan, India, Australia, and European countries have been reluctant to engage more assertively in countering China's maritime advance.

Without these elements, China's expansion in the region is likely to continue, posing challenges to trade, resource extraction, and military operations in the strategically important body of water.

Chinese Potential in the Region and Counteroffensive:

China has the potential to escalate tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) through coercive strategies, military deployments, or even military action against the United States and its allies.

The United States has several options to respond, including deterrence through sanctions or military retaliation, or choosing to thwart China's expansionist activities.

However, the willingness of Southeast Asian nations like Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia to risk their relations with China for collective action is uncertain.

The collective action problem in the SCS is more challenging than that faced by NATO.

While the United States was willing to provide regional security against the Soviet Union, the collapse of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization after the Vietnam War hindered collective security efforts in the region.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed primarily for dispute resolution, not collective security against China.

Only a few countries in ASEAN have a strong interest in the SCS and the capacity to lead collective action.

Understanding Chinese Motivation, Tactics and Offer:

To address the collective action problem, it is essential to understand China's motivations and tactics in the SCS. China has been gradually expanding its control over the region through a combination of military maneuvers, gray-zone tactics, and economic incentives.

• It seeks to secure sovereign control over the SCS by asserting its claims, establishing military bases, and limiting the activities of neighboring countries.

• China's strategy is aimed at diminishing the role of the United States in the region while avoiding direct conflict.

• China uses a combination of sticks and carrots in its approach.

• It employs gray-zone tactics, such as deploying coast guard and fishing fleet vessels, to flood the area and deter adversaries from responding forcefully.

• China also offers economic incentives, aid, and investment to win over ASEAN countries.

• Its Belt and Road Initiative and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have been effective in influencing regional dynamics and undermining the unity of ASEAN on the SCS issue.

China's actions in the SCS have allowed it to steadily advance its interests while avoiding major escalation.

It can maintain military bases, control the sea lanes, and influence Southeast Asian countries without provoking a strong response from the United States or collective action from its allies.

The United States needs to counter China's strategy and tactics to prevent further dominance in the region and protect the interests of itself and its allies.

US Strategy and Collective Action obstacles in the Indo-Pacific Region:

The US strategy in the Indo-Pacific has historically focused on Northeast Asia, prioritizing:

a. The defense of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan:

The United States aims to be prepared to defeat China in case of an attack on Japan and Taiwan or a North Korean invasion of South Korea.

This strategy relies on a combination of massive conventional forces and nuclear weapons for deterrence and escalation control.

Consequently, most of the US forces in the region are based in Northeast Asia.

However, the United States faces challenges in the Indo-Pacific due to resource deployment and sustainment issues, as well as strategy, tactics, and credibility.

China is aware of these challenges and has designed its approach to coerce and influence US allies and partners in the region without provoking the United States to deploy forces from its homeland to the South China Sea (SCS) and other areas.

b. US Reliance on Hub and Spoke Structure:

The US reliance on a "hub and spoke" alliance structure, where the United States acts as the central hub and individual allies are connected like spokes, has limited its ability to organize collective security against China's rise in the SCS and East China Sea (ECS).

For example, the United States has left it up to Japan to defend the Senkaku Islands, and its forces are only prepared to come to the defense of Japanese forces if a clash escalates into a wider war.

In the SCS, the United States did not come to the defense of the Philippines when China took over Scarborough Shoal, and it does not defend the Philippines' claims in the Spratly Islands.

The failure of the United States to take more robust action to support its allies and partners in countering China's advances has weakened some countries' faith in US credibility and allowed China to continue expanding its influence.

This erosion of credibility could eventually lead some partners to align with China and submit to Beijing's will.

US Hub and Spoke System explained
Image Credit: Google

d. Policy of Freedom of Navigation Operations and reliance on International Law:

While the US Navy's freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) demonstrate the defense of international law principles and the ability to sail and fly in the region, these operations have not halted China's incremental advances in the SCS.

China continues to dismiss pleas relating to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruling, the ASEAN Code of Conduct, and related principles, which undermines the effectiveness of US operations.

e. Diverging Interests of Southeast Asian Nations:

In terms of collective action in Southeast Asia, countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have different interests, politics, relationships with the United States and China, and varying positions in the SCS.

Image Credit: Google

These countries also have divergent capabilities that need to be addressed for effective collective action against China.

Despite their differences, there is a basis for collective action among these Southeast Asian states.

For example, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines share interests in the Spratlys and in preventing China from expelling them from their outposts and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

These countries have engaged in diplomatic cooperation, supported the UNCLOS ruling, and interacted through ASEAN and bilateral channels.

• Vietnam: 

Vietnam has also sought security partnerships and diplomatic support in its struggle against China.

Vietnam, in particular, has been developing its maritime capabilities to defend its outposts and EEZ in the Spratly Islands.

It has a rising GDP and a relatively high state capacity, enabling increased defense spending and procurement for its armed forces.

Vietnam's naval and air forces, including submarines and antiship cruise missile batteries, provide a deterrent threat against China in a confrontation.

• The Philippines: 

On the other hand, Philippines has experienced political shifts and fluctuations in its approach to China.

While the previous administration of President Duterte has sought closer ties with China, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) remains committed to the US alliance and resisting China's expansionist activities.

The current administration in Philippines has also adopted the policy of balancing act under the presidency of Bongbong Macros.

• Indonesia: 

Being the largest nation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is pursuing an independent and nonaligned stance, promoting a rules-based international order in ASEAN.

While it maintains cultural reservations towards China, it is not seeking an alliance with the United States but rather a partnership.

Indonesia's strained security partnership with the US due to human rights issues in East Timor is being mended.

However, Indonesia holds strategic importance for the US due to its size, control of the Strait of Malacca, ASEAN leadership, and military development.

In recent years, Indonesia has been focused on strengthening its maritime security, particularly in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Natuna Sea, where it has faced aggressive activities from China.

Indonesia has stationed forces and established bases in the Natuna region as a deterrent, but the bases require improvement.

The country is also enhancing its naval capabilities through weapons acquisitions and has an experienced submarine fleet and anti-ship missiles.

The Indonesian Air Force is expanding its operational capacity and air defenses.

Indonesia prioritizes ASEAN solidarity and the protection of its EEZ in the Natuna Sea, as well as internal defense against violent extremist organizations and separatists.

While it may cooperate with the US in countering Chinese pressure on its EEZ and that of neighboring countries, Indonesia does not support efforts to deny Chinese expansion in the disputed Spratly Islands based on the nine-dash line.

Image Credit: Google

Options for United States:

To effectively counter China's actions in the South China Sea (SCS), the United States could adopt a more assertive approach called targeted denial.

This approach would involve selectively countering Chinese maritime maneuvers, supporting allies like the Philippines in defending their fishing fleets and oil-and-gas platforms, and securing strategic areas like Pag-asa Island and Scarborough Shoal.

The US would need sufficient naval and coast guard assets, as well as improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Diplomatic efforts would also be necessary to gain support and bring China to the negotiating table.

However, the collective action problem among the United States and its allies and partners hinders an effective response to China's assertiveness in the SCS.

Divergent interests, varying foreign policies, and the need for larger and more capable forces in the region contribute to this challenge.

While the US has taken actions such as freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) and providing security assistance, China continues to advance and undermine US credibility.

Adopting a strategy of targeted denial could potentially restore credibility and uphold the rights of Southeast Asian countries, compelling China to negotiate based on international law.

Conclusion:

Conclusively, structural realists predicted that a rising China would seek regional hegemony and potentially lead to war.

China has expanded its territorial claims in the SCS, challenging the status quo and defying international law.

While the US and its allies like Japan and Taiwan have been successful in countering China's ambitions in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asian countries have faced difficulties in upholding their maritime security interests.

By adopting a calibrated approach of targeted denial in alliance with the Philippines, the US could bring China to the negotiating table without provoking a war, although risks remain.

The competition between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific region will persist, and the possibility of future conflicts cannot be ruled out.

In conclusion, the article suggests that a solution to the collective action problem in the South China Sea requires stronger national leadership and capabilities from the Southeast Asian countries, as well as a greater commitment from the United States.

The writer has done MS in International Relations and serves as a Lecturer at Higher Education KP, Pakistan

Related Articles 

Asia-Pacific Region: Second Close Encounter between US and Chinese Militaries in Taiwan Strait

US Secretary of State to Visit China: Focusing on Communication and Military Relations