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| Image Credit: Google |
Adil Javed
China has been extending its sphere of influence in the territorial waters of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia,
and Indonesia, using various measures such as its coast guard, armed fishing
fleet, militias, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy.
China has also
constructed artificial islands and deployed military assets in the disputed
region, posing a challenge to the US and its allies.
The article discusses the collective action problem that hinders the United States and its allies from effectively countering China's expansion in the South China Sea (SCS).
The Collective Action Problem:
The collective
action problem arises from several factors.
a. United States’ approach of Freedom of Navigtaion Operations:
The US grand
strategy and its theater strategy in the Indo-Pacific prevent it from adopting
a more assertive approach that could effectively deter China's advances.
The US has
primarily relied on freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), overflight
operations, and security assistance and cooperation, which have proven
insufficient to halt China's expansion.
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| Image Credit: Google |
b. Weakness of involved South East Asian States:
The four Southeast
Asian states (Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia) are too weak
and divided to effectively collaborate in countering China's increasing influence.
- While Vietnam has a strong military, but its proximity and trade ties with China limit its actions.
- Malaysia has sought cooperation with the US and Vietnam but remains hesitant to expand its military partnership.
- The Philippines, although a US ally, has the weakest military among the four countries and has faced setbacks in the Spratly Islands.
- Indonesia, despite its military strength, is nonaligned and limited in security cooperation activities with the United States.
The lack of
stronger national leadership, capabilities, and commitment from both the
Southeast Asian countries and the US exacerbates the collective action problem.
Developing
countries find it challenging to acquire and maintain expensive weapons systems
necessary for deterring aggression.
c. Constitutional and Politico-Economic Constraints of Japan and Australia:
Constitutional
and politico-economic constraints in Japan and Australia prevent them from
taking more assertive actions.
Even if the US
were to lead in countering China, it would be difficult for the Southeast Asian
states, Japan, and Australia to follow suit.
d. The Leverage of China:
China has
advantages in proximity, infrastructure development, and lending in Southeast
Asia.
However, it
also highlights that China's heavy-handed approach has alienated several
countries.
Despite the
remaining US advantages in soft power, foreign direct investment, naval power,
and alliances, Southeast Asian countries must hedge their relations between the
US and China, making collective action in the SCS more challenging.
The article here,
points out that China's expansion is less difficult to achieve than a
successful attack on Taiwan.
The Southeast
Asian countries' defensive capabilities are more effective in protecting their
land masses than blocking China's expansion in the SCS.
Furthermore,
other potential partners like Japan, India, Australia, and European countries
have been reluctant to engage more assertively in countering China's maritime
advance.
Without these
elements, China's expansion in the region is likely to continue, posing
challenges to trade, resource extraction, and military operations in the
strategically important body of water.
Chinese Potential in the Region and Counteroffensive:
China has the
potential to escalate tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) through coercive
strategies, military deployments, or even military action against the United
States and its allies.
The United
States has several options to respond, including deterrence through sanctions
or military retaliation, or choosing to thwart China's expansionist activities.
However, the
willingness of Southeast Asian nations like Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia,
and Malaysia to risk their relations with China for collective action is
uncertain.
The collective
action problem in the SCS is more challenging than that faced by NATO.
While the
United States was willing to provide regional security against the Soviet
Union, the collapse of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization after the
Vietnam War hindered collective security efforts in the region.
The Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed primarily for dispute resolution,
not collective security against China.
Only a few
countries in ASEAN have a strong interest in the SCS and the capacity to lead
collective action.
Understanding Chinese Motivation, Tactics and Offer:
To address the
collective action problem, it is essential to understand China's motivations
and tactics in the SCS. China has been gradually expanding its control over the
region through a combination of military maneuvers, gray-zone tactics, and
economic incentives.
- It seeks to secure sovereign control over the SCS by asserting its claims, establishing military bases, and limiting the activities of neighboring countries.
- China's strategy is aimed at diminishing the role of the United States in the region while avoiding direct conflict.
- China uses a combination of sticks and carrots in its approach.
- It employs gray-zone tactics, such as deploying coast guard and fishing fleet vessels, to flood the area and deter adversaries from responding forcefully.
- China also offers economic incentives, aid, and investment to win over ASEAN countries.
- Its Belt and Road Initiative and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank have been effective in influencing regional dynamics and undermining the unity of ASEAN on the SCS issue.
China's actions
in the SCS have allowed it to steadily advance its interests while avoiding
major escalation.
It can maintain
military bases, control the sea lanes, and influence Southeast Asian countries
without provoking a strong response from the United States or collective action
from its allies.
The United
States needs to counter China's strategy and tactics to prevent further
dominance in the region and protect the interests of itself and its allies.
US Strategy and Collective Action obstacles in the Indo-Pacific Region:
The US strategy
in the Indo-Pacific has historically focused on Northeast Asia, prioritizing:
a. The defense of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan:
The United States
aims to be prepared to defeat China in case of an attack on Japan and Taiwan or
a North Korean invasion of South Korea.
This strategy
relies on a combination of massive conventional forces and nuclear weapons for
deterrence and escalation control.
Consequently,
most of the US forces in the region are based in Northeast Asia.
However, the
United States faces challenges in the Indo-Pacific due to resource deployment
and sustainment issues, as well as strategy, tactics, and credibility.
China is aware
of these challenges and has designed its approach to coerce and influence US
allies and partners in the region without provoking the United States to deploy
forces from its homeland to the South China Sea (SCS) and other areas.
b. US Reliance on Hub and Spoke Structure:
The US reliance
on a "hub and spoke" alliance structure, where the United States acts
as the central hub and individual allies are connected like spokes, has limited
its ability to organize collective security against China's rise in the SCS and
East China Sea (ECS).
For example,
the United States has left it up to Japan to defend the Senkaku Islands, and
its forces are only prepared to come to the defense of Japanese forces if a
clash escalates into a wider war.
In the SCS, the
United States did not come to the defense of the Philippines when China took
over Scarborough Shoal, and it does not defend the Philippines' claims in the
Spratly Islands.
The failure of
the United States to take more robust action to support its allies and partners
in countering China's advances has weakened some countries' faith in US
credibility and allowed China to continue expanding its influence.
This erosion of
credibility could eventually lead some partners to align with China and submit
to Beijing's will.
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| US Hub and Spoke System explained Image Credit: Google |
d. Policy of Freedom of Navigation Operations and reliance on International Law:
While the US
Navy's freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) demonstrate the defense of
international law principles and the ability to sail and fly in the region, these
operations have not halted China's incremental advances in the SCS.
China continues to dismiss pleas relating to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) ruling, the ASEAN Code of Conduct, and related principles, which undermines the effectiveness of US operations.
e. Diverging Interests of Southeast Asian Nations:
In terms of
collective action in Southeast Asia, countries like Vietnam, the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Indonesia have different interests, politics, relationships with
the United States and China, and varying positions in the SCS.
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| Image Credit: Google |
These countries
also have divergent capabilities that need to be addressed for effective
collective action against China.
Despite their
differences, there is a basis for collective action among these Southeast Asian
states.
For example,
Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines share interests in the Spratlys and in
preventing China from expelling them from their outposts and Exclusive Economic
Zones (EEZs).
These countries have engaged in diplomatic cooperation, supported the UNCLOS ruling, and interacted through ASEAN and bilateral channels.
- Vietnam:
Vietnam has also sought security partnerships and diplomatic support in its struggle against China.
Vietnam, in
particular, has been developing its maritime capabilities to defend its
outposts and EEZ in the Spratly Islands.
It has a rising
GDP and a relatively high state capacity, enabling increased defense spending
and procurement for its armed forces.
Vietnam's naval
and air forces, including submarines and antiship cruise missile batteries,
provide a deterrent threat against China in a confrontation.
- The Philippines:
On the other hand, Philippines has experienced political shifts
and fluctuations in its approach to China.
While the
previous administration of President Duterte has sought closer ties with China,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) remains committed to the US alliance
and resisting China's expansionist activities.
The current
administration in Philippines has also adopted the policy of balancing act
under the presidency of Bongbong Macros.
- Indonesia:
Being the largest nation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is pursuing
an independent and nonaligned stance, promoting a rules-based international
order in ASEAN.
While it
maintains cultural reservations towards China, it is not seeking an alliance
with the United States but rather a partnership.
Indonesia's
strained security partnership with the US due to human rights issues in East
Timor is being mended.
However,
Indonesia holds strategic importance for the US due to its size, control of the
Strait of Malacca, ASEAN leadership, and military development.
In recent
years, Indonesia has been focused on strengthening its maritime security,
particularly in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Natuna Sea, where it
has faced aggressive activities from China.
Indonesia has
stationed forces and established bases in the Natuna region as a deterrent, but
the bases require improvement.
The country is
also enhancing its naval capabilities through weapons acquisitions and has an
experienced submarine fleet and anti-ship missiles.
The Indonesian
Air Force is expanding its operational capacity and air defenses.
Indonesia
prioritizes ASEAN solidarity and the protection of its EEZ in the Natuna Sea,
as well as internal defense against violent extremist organizations and
separatists.
While it may cooperate with the US in countering Chinese pressure on its EEZ and that of neighboring countries, Indonesia does not support efforts to deny Chinese expansion in the disputed Spratly Islands based on the nine-dash line.
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| Image Credit: Google |
Options for United States:
To effectively
counter China's actions in the South China Sea (SCS), the United States could
adopt a more assertive approach called targeted denial.
This approach
would involve selectively countering Chinese maritime maneuvers, supporting
allies like the Philippines in defending their fishing fleets and oil-and-gas
platforms, and securing strategic areas like Pag-asa Island and Scarborough
Shoal.
The US would
need sufficient naval and coast guard assets, as well as improved intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
Diplomatic
efforts would also be necessary to gain support and bring China to the
negotiating table.
However, the
collective action problem among the United States and its allies and partners
hinders an effective response to China's assertiveness in the SCS.
Divergent
interests, varying foreign policies, and the need for larger and more capable
forces in the region contribute to this challenge.
While the US
has taken actions such as freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) and
providing security assistance, China continues to advance and undermine US
credibility.
Adopting a strategy of targeted denial could potentially restore credibility and uphold the rights of Southeast Asian countries, compelling China to negotiate based on international law.
Conclusion:
Conclusively,
structural realists predicted that a rising China would seek regional hegemony
and potentially lead to war.
China has
expanded its territorial claims in the SCS, challenging the status quo and
defying international law.
While the US
and its allies like Japan and Taiwan have been successful in countering China's
ambitions in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asian countries have faced difficulties
in upholding their maritime security interests.
By adopting a
calibrated approach of targeted denial in alliance with the Philippines, the US
could bring China to the negotiating table without provoking a war, although
risks remain.
The competition
between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific region will persist, and the
possibility of future conflicts cannot be ruled out.
In conclusion,
the article suggests that a solution to the collective action problem in the
South China Sea requires stronger national leadership and capabilities from the
Southeast Asian countries, as well as a greater commitment from the United
States.
The writer has done MS in International Relations and serves as a Lecturer at Higher Education KP, Pakistan
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